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Most economic activity occurs in cities. This creates a tension between local increasing returns, implied
by the existence of cities, and aggregate constant returns, implied by balanced growth. To address this
tension, we develop a theory of economic growth in an urban environment. We show how the urban
structure is the margin that eliminates local increasing returns to yield constant returns to scale in the ag-
gregate, thereby implying a city size distribution that is well described by a power distribution with coef-
ficient one: Zipf’s Law. Under strong assumptions our theory produces Zipf’s Law exactly. More gener-
ally, it produces the systematic deviations from Zipf’s Law observed in the data, namely, the underrepre-
sentation of small cities and the absence of very large ones. In these cases, the model identifies the stan-
dard deviation of industry productivity shocks as the key element determining dispersion in the city size
distribution. We present evidence that the dispersion of city sizes is consistent with the dispersion of pro-
ductivity shocks in the data.
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Reserve System.1. INTRODUCTION
Most economic activity occurs in cities. In the United States at the turn of the
millennium 80% of the population lived in urban agglomerations, and they earned
around 85% of income. As a result, understanding aggregate economic activity re-
quires perforce theories of urban economic activity. One of the key elements of such
a theory is that cities emerge out of the trade-oﬀ between agglomeration eﬀects and
congestion costs. Agglomeration in cities implies urban scale eﬀects, which create
a tension between increasing returns at the city level and constant returns at the
aggregate level, which are crucial for balanced growth1.I ng e n e r a l ,m o d e l sw i t ha g -
gregate scale eﬀects do not exhibit the linearity necessary for balanced growth. In
particular, growth theories should explain why permanent growth is possible and why
growth rates are stable, bounded and do not depend solely on population growth. In
this paper we explain how urban structure eliminates local increasing returns to yield
constant returns to scale in the aggregate, which is crucial for balanced growth, and
how balanced growth implies a city size distribution that is well described by a power
distribution with coeﬃcient one: Zipf’s Law.
The essence of our approach is to identify the urban structure as the margin that
leads to constant returns to scale in the economy. In equilibrium, city sizes are deter-
mined out of the trade-oﬀ between the increasing returns implied by agglomeration
and the decreasing returns caused by congestion forces. Given factor proportions and
productivity levels, each city will then produce at an optimal scale and industries will
behave as if using a constant returns to scale technology by varying the number of
cities. In this way, introducing urban structure results in linear aggregate production
functions in a world with increasing return technologies. This mechanism then has
very strong implications for the size distribution of cities once we include factor ac-
cumulation and productivity shocks. In particular it delivers the striking regularity
1By this we are referring to the production set of the aggregate economy. In models such as Lucas
[16], increasing returns at the industry level are transformed into constant returns at the aggregate
by assuming a linear human capital accumulation technology.
1known as Zipf’s Law of cities: The rank of city sizes is proportional to the inverse of
their size.
The ability of this mechanism to replicate the city size distribution depends upon
the way we introduce factor accumulation and productivity shocks. In particular, its
ability to produce Zipf’s Law is derived from its ability to produce Gibrat’s Law of
cities — the mean and variance of the growth rate of a city are independent of its size
— which, as shown by Gabaix [10] and extended by Cordoba [5], is both necessary and
suﬃcient to produce an invariant distribution for city sizes that satisﬁes Zipf’s Law.
To ﬁx ideas, consider ﬁrst a simple economy in which the only factors of production
are labor and human capital both growing at constant rates. With constant total
factor productivity, city sizes evolve at a constant rate. Mean zero shocks to the level
of total factor productivity will not aﬀect mean city growth rates, but will aﬀect the
distribution of city sizes directly, which implies that, if shocks are permanent, the
growth process of cities is scale independent. More generally, productivity shocks will
aﬀect the distribution of city sizes both directly and through their eﬀect on factor
accumulation. The bulk of the paper is devoted to a study of the interaction of these
eﬀects and their ability to produce or approximate Gibrat’s Law.
In addition to establishing the remarkable robustness of Zipf’s Law as a description
of the size distribution of cities, the empirical literature has also stressed a number of
robust deviations. One of the most notable is that, relative to Zipf’s Law, small cities
are underrepresented and the largest cities are not ‘large enough.’ A second is that
there is some systematic variation in the dispersion of city sizes across countries. We
show that our theory, in the cases where the direct eﬀect of shocks does not exactly
balance the indirect eﬀect of shocks through factor accumulation, is able to produce
these systematic deviations from Zipf’s Law. In particular, the model identiﬁes the
standard deviation of industry productivity shocks as the key element determining
dispersion in the size distribution of cities.
There are potentially many ways of introducing agglomeration forces and factor
accumulation into an urban growth model. This paper illustrates these interactions
2using a very particular speciﬁcation for these forces, but we argue that the insights are
much more general. In our formulation, cities are the result of the trade-oﬀ between
production externalities and commuting costs, while growth can be either endogenous
as a result of linear human capital accumulation or the exogenous result of technolog-
ical change. Adding industry productivity shocks to this speciﬁcation will then result
in a distribution of city sizes where all cities in one industry will have the same size.
This paper draws from four related literatures. The ﬁrst is the extensive literature
on growth and, in particular, the large number of papers on endogenous growth that
w e r es p a w n e db yt h ec o n t r i b u t i o n so fL u c a s[ 1 6 ]a n dR o m e r[ 1 7 ] .I nt h i sl i t e r a t u r e ,
as emphasized by Jones [15], the treatment of scale eﬀe c t si sc r u c i a l ,a si ti st h e
imposition of linearity in the aggregate production technology that is necessary for
the existence of balanced growth. Where our paper diﬀers is in its utilization of the
urban structure as the vehicle for obtaining this linearity.
A second related literature is the small number of papers on urban growth. The
two main papers in this group are Black and Henderson [4] and Eaton and Eckstein
[8], which both present deterministic urban growth models with two types of cities in
which, along the balanced growth path, both cities grow at the same rate. Our paper
is most closely related to the contribution of Black and Henderson [4], whom we follow
in using the formulation of Henderson [12] as a vehicle for introducing cities. Unlike
both of these papers, ours focuses on a stochastic environment and introduces a rich
industrial structure which allows us to characterize the evolution of the entire size
distribution of cities over time. In addition, both of these papers obtain the linearity
of the aggregate production process by assuming knife-edge conditions on production
parameters.
Following the original paper of Auerbach [3], a substantial literature has arisen
that investigates the empirical foundations of Zipf’s Law. Rosen and Resnick [18]
documented this regularity in the 1980s for a wide range of countries, while Soo
[19] has updated this study using modern data and more sophisticated econometric
techniques. One of the key ﬁndings of this literature is the robustness of this phenom-
3enon both over time and across countries. As illustrated in Figure One for the United
States, Zipf’s Law appears to be as good a description of the size distribution of cities
at the turn of the Twenty-First century as it was at the turn of the Twentieth.






















This visual impression for U.S. data has been veriﬁed in the careful statistical
work of Dobkins and Ioannides [6] and Ioannides and Overman [14]. As illustrated
in Figures Two A and B, Zipf’s Law also appears to be a good description of the
size distribution of cities across a broad range of countries today. The description is
not perfect. Some countries have a size distribution that is more or less even than
that predicted by Zipf’s Law, which is reﬂected in ﬂatter or steeper plots of log-rank
against log-size. There is also a broad tendency for the relationship to be slightly
concave, at least once one controls for a country’s capital city. These deviations from
Zipf’s Law are precisely the ones emphasized in the discussion above.
Finally, this paper is related to a number of proposed explanations of Zipf’s Law.
These papers can be distinguished by the emphasis given to the process leading to
the formation of cities as opposed to the process determining the growth of cities.
Gabaix [10] provided a proof that Gibrat’s Law is suﬃcient to generate an invariant
4distribution for city sizes that satisﬁes Zipf’s Law. This result was later extended by
Cordoba [5], who proved that Gibrat’s Law is both necessary and suﬃcient. Both pa-
pers provide economic models that generate city growth that satisﬁes Gibrat’s Law:
in Gabaix [10] and [11], cities grow as labor migrates in response to city amenity
shocks, while in Cordoba [5] labor is allocated across cities in response to a power
distribution of taste shocks. Neither paper generates the existence of cities endoge-
nously. In a recent study, Duranton [7] presents a quality ladder model of growth
which, under very particular assumptions on the location and mobility of new ﬁrms,
is capable of producing a size distribution of cities that is close to a power distribution.
By contrast, in our paper, the city size distribution arises endogenously out of the
growth process in a way that both eliminates scale eﬀects in growth and approximates















































The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the model.
Section 3 derives the main results of the paper, namely, the results on growth, Zipf’s
Law and deviations from Zipf’s Law. Section 4 illustrates the results of the model
numerically and compares them to data on several countries. Section 5 concludes.
An appendix contains the decentralization of the allocation presented in the text, as
well as proofs of all propositions in the paper.
2 .A NU R B A NG R O W T HM O D E L
Consider an economy in which production occurs at speciﬁc locations that we call
cities. Firms set up in a city, hiring capital and employing workers. Agglomeration
results from a positive production externality on labor and human capital. Agents
reside in cities and commute to work. Households are made up of workers who
consume, accumulate physical capital to be used in each industry, and devote their
time to working and learning so as to accumulate industry speciﬁc human capital. We
assume log-linear preferences and Cobb-Douglas production functions so that both
6the growth path and the city size distribution can be solved in closed form.
Cities
Our approach to modeling cities follows the classic paper of Henderson [12] and
has been used in the urban growth model of Black and Henderson [4]. We consider a
world in which there are a large number of potential city sites. Cities are monocentric,
with all production occurring at the single exogenously given central business district
( C B D ) .I ti sa s s u m e dt h a te v e r ya g e n tt h a tw o r k sa tt h eC B Dm u s tr e s i d ei nt h e
area surrounding the city. Locations closer to the CBD are more desirable because
they involve a shorter commute to work. Speciﬁcally, we assume that the cost of
commuting is linear in the distance travelled, and we let τ be the cost per mile of
commuting in terms of the output of the city, which is the numeraire commodity.
All agents consume the services of one unit of land per period. In order for agents
to be indiﬀerent about where to live in the city, rents diﬀer by the amount of the
commuting cost, with rents on the city edge equal to zero. Therefore, in a city of
radius ¯ z, rents at a distance z from the center must be given by
R(z)=τ (¯ z − z).































where b =2 π−1













in terms of rents and commuting costs.
Firms
Production occurs in ﬁrms that face a constant returns to scale technology. The
production of a representative ﬁrm in industry j located in an arbitrary city at any







where ˜ Atj is the total factor productivity of an urban ﬁrm (given that good j is
produced in that city), ktj is the amount of industry j speciﬁc capital used by that
ﬁrm, htj is the amount of human capital, and ntj is the number of workers employed
in a ﬁrm, each of whom spends a fraction utj of his or her time at work.
There is a local externality in the labour input, so that the productivity of any ﬁrm
in the city depends upon the number of workers in a city and the amount of human
capital they have





where Atj is an industry speciﬁc productivity shock and ˜ Htj and ˜ Ntj represent the
total stock of human capital and the total amount of labor in the city. This is the
force causing agglomeration in the model. Firms are assumed to be small, taking
the size of the externality as given. The industry speciﬁc productivity shock is ﬁnite
order Markov and is distributed according to a density function with ﬁnite moments.
We need to impose an additional restriction on the technology. The original set of J
industries has to allow a partition, with at least two elements of J in each component
of the partition, where all elements in a component have the same technology para-
meters. That is, each industry has to have at least two varieties (counted in J)t h a t
are produced with exactly the same technology, but may be produced with diﬀerent
8amounts of human and physical capital, and receive diﬀerent shocks. In line with
much of the literature, we see this as a natural way of organizing the set of products
observed in the economy. Some products are distinguished because they are produced
with fundamentally diﬀerent technologies, while others embody diﬀerent designs or
fulﬁll diﬀerent purposes. Limiting the amount of ex-ante heterogeneity within these
groups of industries is necessary for the growth process of the corresponding group
of cities to satisfy Gibrat’s Law in certain cases we describe in detail below. In these
cases we can then aggregate all industries to show that cities in the economy satisfy
Zipf’s law.
Households
The economy is populated by a unit measure of identical small households. The
initial number of people per household is N0, and we assume that the population of
each household grows exogenously at rate gN. Each household starts with the same
strictly positive endowments of industry j speciﬁcp h y s i c a l(Kj0) and human (Hj0)
capital.














where δ is a discount factor that lies strictly between zero and 1/(1 + gN) and Ctj
denotes a sequence of state contingent consumption of each good j. Here E0 is an
expectation operator conditional on all information available to the household at
time zero.
Capital services in industry j are proportional to the stock of industry j-speciﬁc






Here investment in industry j, Xj, is assumed to be denominated in terms of that
9industry’s consumption good.
Each member of the household is endowed with one unit of time in each period,
which can be devoted to either the accumulation of human capital or the provision
of labor services in each of the j industries. In order to work in industry j, am e m b e r
of the household must be physically present (at the start of the period) at a location
that produces good j. Hence we can think of the household distributing Nj of its

















j are positive constants. This speciﬁcation allows us to nest both
endogenous and exogenous growth within the same framework. If B1
j =0 , then human
capital evolves exogenously at a constant rate B0
j and we have an exogenous growth
model. If B1
j is positive, then the time allocation of a worker aﬀects the growth rate
o ft h ee c o n o m y ,w h i c hr e s u l t si na ne n d o g e n o u sg r o w t hm o d e l . T h ea s s u m p t i o no f
linearity is made for simplicity, but is not necessary to generate balanced growth in
this model since, as we will show below, the economy exhibits constant returns to
scale in the aggregate.
Eﬃcient allocations
All Pareto eﬃcient allocations are the solution of the following Social Planning
Problem: Choose state contingent sequences
©
















10subject to, for all t and j,
Ctj + Xtj + b ˜ N
3
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µtj ˜ Ntj, (3)
Ktj = µtj ˜ Ktj, (4)















The ﬁrst constraint states that consumption plus investment plus commuting costs
has to be less than or equal to production in all cities in the industry, where µtj
denotes the number of cities in industry j at time t.
The problem of choosing the optimal sizes of cities is a static problem: The planner
sets the city size to maximize output net of commuting costs. We solve this problem
ﬁrst and then, imposing the solution, we solve for the dynamics. Toward this, we can
rewrite the resource constraint in an industry j at time t as a function of industrywide
variables and the number of cities in an industry. Namely,

















The ﬁrst order condition with respect to µtj (which we show in the appendix is




























11That is, the planner increases the number of people in the city until the change in
commuting costs per person for current residents (left hand side) is equal to the
change in earnings per person for current residents (right hand side).
Now consider the eﬀect of an increase in productivity. Everything else equal, output
per worker increases and the planner ﬁnds it optimal to attract more workers to the
city. If the productivity increase is permanent, the city will be permanently larger.
The growth model presented above will be, in essence, a mechanism for producing
permanent increases in the average product of labor in a city, while at the same time
remaining consistent with the aggregate growth facts.
It is important that, in response to a productivity shock, average commuting costs
do not rise by exactly the same amount as the average product of labor; if they do,
the planner would ﬁnd it optimal not to change the city’s size. If commuting costs
were to rise by less, or even more, than the average product of labor, the basic result
that productivity shocks are translated into ﬂuctuations in city size will remain. In
the model below we ensure that this is the case by denominating commuting costs
within a city in terms of the output of that city. Other assumptions would work as
well. However, one combination of assumptions that does not work is if commuting
costs are denominated in units of time while at the same time workers supply labor
inelastically and the production function is Cobb-Douglas. The reason is that, with
Cobb-Douglas production, marginal and average products are proportional and hence
commuting costs measured as forgone wages will rise at exactly the same rate as the
average product of labor.
Rearranging the ﬁrst order condition, we also ﬁnd that the optimal number of cities


















12Notice that we need to impose




since otherwise total commuting costs would be larger than total output in the in-



















and notice that if the above condition is not satisﬁed, as the number of cities decreases,
given industry aggregates, the value of the expression increases unboundedly. This
implies that the above problem has no internal solution: The planner would like to
make cities as large as possible.
Substituting the results for the optimal number of cities and total commuting costs
in the resource constraint yields








tj ≡ ˆ Ytj (11)
where







































Since utj ≤ 1, output net of commuting costs for the optimal city structure (ˆ Ytj)i s
constant returns to scale in industry aggregates. Notice that by equation (10) output
in the industry is also a constant returns to scale function of inputs in the industry.
13The constraint in (11) contains the ﬁrst main result of our paper: introducing the
margin of the creation of new cities eliminates increasing returns at the urban level
from the aggregate problem. This has implications for the way in which we view
the growth process. First, it allows us to reconcile the coexistence of cities, which in
turn implies the existence of scale economies, with balanced growth. Second, it shows
that it is inappropriate to test for the existence of increasing returns with aggregate
data even though increasing returns are in fact present in the production technology.
Third, diﬀerences in the way production is organized in cities will determine the level
of aggregate productivity (the magnitude of Fj in equation (11)). This suggests the
possibility that diﬀerences in the pattern of urbanization are the source of diﬀerences
in total factor productivity across countries2. In our theory, these sort of diﬀerences in
productivity can be distinguished from technology levels through the fact that there
is likely to be more time variation in the latter. To clarify this last point, suppose
that cities are organized at a suboptimal size, either too large or too small, captured


































which, as can be easily checked, has a global optimum at κj =1 . Hence, by organizing
cities ineﬃciently (too small or too large), the economy would produce with lower
total factor productivity. In what follows we set κj =1 , since it does not aﬀect any
of the urban or growth implications of the model.
Notice that in this model linearity in human capital accumulation implies that
growth rates are constant in the long run, even with increasing returns in the aggregate
2Au and Henderson [1] examines this possibility for the particular case of China.
14production function. In general, this type of linearity plays two diﬀerent roles in
growth models: It is a source of endogenous growth, and it prevents growth rates
f r o md i v e r g i n gt oi n ﬁnity. In this paper, this linearity serves the ﬁrst and not the
second purpose. We use it to show that our results do not depend on the source of
growth and, in particular, whether it is exogenous or endogenous. To illustrate this
p o i n t ,s u p p o s ew es e t1 <α j +βj +γj for all j, and we let human capital accumulate
exactly as physical capital. Then, without cities, due to the presence of aggregate
increasing returns, growth rates diverge to inﬁnity. However, with increasing returns
at the city level, the mechanism we have introduced in this paper would yield constant
returns in the aggregate and balanced growth.
After substituting for the optimal number of cities, the result is a standard dynamic
problem with constant returns to scale production technology. In particular, our
problem becomes one of choosing {Ctj,X tj,N tj,u tj,K tj,H tj}
∞,J
t=0,j=1 so as to maximize
(1) subject to (11), (3), (6), and (7). The value function of the planner has the form















which is the result of the particular log-linear speciﬁcation we have assumed. We
could set up a more general model at the cost of losing the ability to solve the
model analytically. The details of the solution, together with expressions for the
parameters of the value function, are contained in the appendix. Three basic results
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¢iNt.
Investment is a constant share of output net of commuting costs
Xtj =
δDK
j (1 − ωj)
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ˆ Ytj ≡ xj ˆ Ytj,
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The original problem is not a convex dynamic optimization problem. However,
since the city size problem is static, we can solve it separately and, as discussed in
the text, transform the problem into a convex dynamic optimization problem. This
argument, when formalized, leads to the following proposition.
Proposition 1 There exists a unique Pareto eﬃcient allocation for this economy.
Decentralization
We have shown how, by solving the urban problem separately, we can convert a
problem with local increasing returns to scale into a problem with aggregate constant
returns to scale. This was possible because the planner internalizes the externality
and therefore the Pareto optimum implies eﬃcient city sizes. In order to explain the
observed city size distributions, it is necessary to consider also competitive equilibrium
allocations. We now proceed to introduce a competitive equilibrium framework for
which the unique equilibrium allocation attains the optimum. As is standard in
the previous literature, we use city developers that internalize the urban production
externality.
We follow Henderson [12] and postulate the existence of a class of competitive
property developers that own each potential city site and compete to attract workers
and ﬁrms. Property developers aim to maximize total rents from their land. In order
to attract workers to the city, developers may pay each resident a transfer. They may
also attract ﬁrms by subsidizing physical and human capital, although they never
choose to use the former as there is no externality in physical capital. Agents derive
utility out of consumption of goods that are costlessly tradable, and so they will live
in the city if their income after rents, commuting costs, and transfers is larger than
what they could obtain elsewhere. Firms will produce in the city as long as proﬁts
16are nonnegative. Free entry implies that developers earn zero proﬁts in equilibrium.
Solving this problem results in city sizes that are given by a condition that is identical
to the expression for the optimal size of cities arising from the social planner’s problem
(8). Given the size of the industry, this will, in general, mean that we must allow for
the possibility of a non-integer number of cities, all of which will be identical in size
within an industry. Since developers are fully internalizing the external eﬀect, the
equilibrium allocation will be eﬃcient.
The details of the developer’s problem are presented in the appendix, together with
the complete statement of the competitive equilibrium, which is standard. We present
the analogs of both Welfare Theorems in the next two propositions.
Proposition 2 There exists a competitive equilibrium that attains the Pareto eﬃcient
allocation.
Proposition 3 Every competitive equilibrium in this economy is Pareto eﬃcient.
3. ANALYTICAL RESULTS
With these results in hand, we are free to make use of the solution to the social
planning problem in order to characterize the competitive equilibrium of the model.
As shown in the appendix, under our functional form assumptions, we are able to solve
for the entire equilibrium growth path and size distribution of cities in closed form.
A couple of general points are worth making. First, although the main reason for
our functional form assumptions is tractability, they have some additional expository
merit: the assumptions imply that the labor allocation across industries is ﬁxed
independently of productivity shocks. This means that our ability to match the size
distribution of cities is being driven solely by forces operating at the city level. It
also means that if we were to relax this assumption and calibrate the model to match
17the size distribution of industries (which, although not obeying a rank size rule, is at
least closer to it than produced by our model) we should get a city size distribution
even closer to Zipf’s Law.
Second, the model is capable of producing growth, either exogenously or endoge-
nously. More importantly, the model delivers two properties not present in most
other urban growth models: a balanced growth path exists, and growth is positive
even in the absence of population growth. On the balanced growth path (with no
uncertainty) we know that the growth rates of capital (gKj), human capital (gHj),
and output net of commuting costs (gˆ Yj)a r ec o n s t a n t ,s o
gKt+1j =l n Kt+1j − lnKtj = −(1 − ωj)lnKtj +( 1− ωj)lnXtj
=( 1 − ωj)
h
lnxj +l nˆ Ytj
i
− (1 − ωj)lnKtj.










For income, when ˆ βj < 1,
gˆ Yt+1j =l n ˆ Yt+1j − ln ˆ Ytj
=
1
1 − ˆ βj
h
[lnAt+1j − lnAtj]+ˆ αjgHj +
³
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´
gNj
1 − ˆ βj
.
Third, the distribution of city sizes is determined by a static process each period.














3For the case when ˆ βj =1 , gN = gH =0 , and ω =0(the AK model), gˆ Yt+1j =l nxj +ln(FjAtj).
18From this equation it is easy to see that anything that increases the level of the
average product of labor will increase the average size of the city. Indeed, it is the
eﬀect of shocks on the average product of labor, both contemporaneously and in the
future, that determines the growth process of a city.
Given the evolution of output in each industry, we can study the evolution of the












=2 [ l n ( At+1j) − ln(Atj)] − 2
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+2ˆ βj [ln(Kt+1j) − ln(Ktj)].
Recursively substituting for capital growth, we get an expression for the long run
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[gHj − gN]+2[ l n( At+1j) − ln(Atj)]

















Both the aggregate labor growth rate and human capital growth rate are constants,
with the only stochastic part of the growth expression coming from productivity
shocks today and the eﬀects of past shocks on capital accumulation. Note that,
as the economy grows, and more human capital is accumulated, the size of cities
may increase or decrease indeﬁnitely. This may result in the number of cities in the
economy going to zero or inﬁnity. Human capital accumulation implies that cities
become bigger, while population growth implies that cities become smaller (since per
capita human and physical capital decrease). The condition that guarantees that the
19number of cities is constant over time (without uncertainty) is given by
gN =
2ˆ αj
1 − ˆ βj +2ˆ αj
gHj,
which implies that population grows slower than human capital.
Equation (12) is the key equation of our model. From this equation we can deduce
conditions under which we can guarantee Gibrat’s Law for each group of cities deﬁned
by our partition of industries, that is, conditions under which the expected long run
growth rate and variance do not depend on any past information and hence are
independent of city size distributions in previous periods. That Gibrat’s Law implies
Zipf’s Law follows from the results in Gabaix [10] and [11], later extended by Cordoba
[5].
The ﬁrst set of conditions amount to eliminating physical capital from the model.
Without physical capital, productivity shocks are not propagated via capital stocks.
This implies that if the growth rate of productivity shocks is time independent (shocks
are permanent), the growth rate of cities will be time independent as well. Physical
capital is eliminated if it either cannot be accumulated (ωj =1for all j) or is not an
input in production (ˆ βj =0for all j). Under either of these conditions, we obtain
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=4 Vt(ln(At+1j) − ln(Atj)),
both of which are obviously scale independent.
The second set of conditions amount to transforming the model into an AK model
with no human capital and 100% depreciation. In this context, both last period output
and capital react linearly to last period shocks. These two eﬀects cancel out, and so
the only remaining source of uncertainty is the contemporaneous productivity shock.
If on top of this we assume that industry shocks are transitory, we obtain Gibrat’s
20Law. The next proposition formalizes these arguments; all proofs are relegated to the
appendix.
Proposition 4 (Exact Gibrat’s Law and Zipf’s Law) The growth process of city sizes
satisﬁes Gibrat’s Law, and therefore the invariant distribution for city sizes satisﬁes
Zipf’s Law, if and only if one of the following two conditions is satisﬁed:
1. (No physical capital) There is no physical capital
³
βj = ˆ βj =0or ωj =1
´
,a n d
productivity shocks are permanent.
2. (AK model) City production is linear in physical capital and there is no human
capital
³
ˆ αj =0 , ˆ βj =1
´
, depreciation is 100% (ωj =0 ), and productivity shocks
are temporary.
The intuition for the above result is straightforward. In order to generate Zipf’s
Law as an invariant distribution, we need the growth processes at the city level to
be independent of scale. As labor is perfectly mobile across cities and industries, this
in turn requires that the marginal product of labor be independent of scale. The
proposition outlines two scenarios in which this is exactly the case: the ﬁrst is one
in which current productivity shocks are the only stochastic force in growth and are
permanent, thus producing permanent increases in the level of the marginal product
of labor, so that the growth rate of the marginal product is independent of scale. This
result is invariant to whether the engine of growth is endogenous or exogenous. The
second case is one in which productivity shocks are temporary, but have a permanent
eﬀect on the marginal product of labor through the accumulation of physical capital
in a linear production setting4.
Obviously, the conditions outlined in Proposition 4 are restrictive. Reality surely
lies between these two extremes: capital is a factor of production, but not the only one.
4Note that if we were to allow inﬁnite order Markov processes for Aj,w ec o u l dﬁne tune the
speciﬁcation of the process so as to yield Zipf’s Law exactly for any parameter set.
21The question that arises is, Between these two extremes, how close are the predictions
of the model to observed urban structures? As mentioned in the introduction, an
extensive empirical literature (surveyed in Gabaix and Ioannides [9]) has uncovered
two systematic departures from Zipf’s Law. First, plots of log-rank against log-size
are concave, reﬂecting the fact that small cities are underrepresented and that big
cities are not ‘big enough.’ Second, there is some variation in cross country estimates
of Zipf’s coeﬃcients, with this variation positively correlated with per capita income:
richer countries have a more even city size distribution (Soo [19]).
In the next two Propositions we argue that, in general, the model produces these
same deviations from Zipf’s Law. First we show that if a city is relatively large because
it experienced a history of productivity shocks above average, it can be expected to
grow slower than average in the future, while the opposite is true of small cities. To
understand this we can use the expression for the long run growth rates of cities (12)
to show how capital investments aﬀect the urban size distribution. Suppose that an
industry has experienced very high shocks in the past. This implies that output in
that industry will be relatively high, and, since investment is a fraction of output,
investment in industry speciﬁc physical capital has been high. This is expressed in









ωj +( 1− ωj) ˆ βj
´´−1 ln(At−sj).
Since this term reduces the growth rate of cities, it implies that large cities will grow
at a relatively lower rate than small cities (cities that have experienced low shocks
and so have invested little in capital). Intuitively, since ˆ β<1, diminishing returns to
capital imply that industries with high capital stocks have a lower return to capital
than industries with low capital stocks, and so industries with relatively low stocks of
physical capital grow faster. This eﬀect is emphasized by the fact that when ωj > 0
for all j, in order to keep physical capital constant, industry investments have to be
higher in industries with large capital stocks and lower in industries with low capital
22stocks. Since city growth is proportional to industry output growth, this implies
that small cities grow faster than large cities: urban growth rates exhibit reversion
to the mean. The result is that the log rank-size relationship will in general (apart
from particular realizations of the shocks) be concave5. That is, relative to a linear
relationship, there are not enough small cities and large cities are not large enough.
Proposition 5 (Concavity) If conditions 1 and 2 in Proposition 4 are not satisﬁed,
the growth rate for cities exhibits reversion to the mean.
Unless the conditions of Proposition 4 are satisﬁed, variation in the standard devi-
a t i o no fp r o d u c t i v i t ys h o c k sw i l la ﬀect the distribution of city sizes. Intuitively, given
capital stocks, a larger standard deviation of shocks implies a larger standard devia-
tion of city sizes and a larger standard deviation of investments, which in turn implies
a more dispersed distribution of capital stocks. This would explain the positive cor-
relation between Zipf’s coeﬃcients and income if high income countries experience
less volatile shocks. We formalize this intuition in the following proposition.
Proposition 6 If conditions 1 and 2 in Proposition 4 are not satisﬁed, the standard
deviation of city sizes increases with the standard deviation of industry shocks.
Proposition 6 points to the standard deviation of productivity shocks as the key
parameter linking our model with the observed urban structure. In the next section we
explore if international evidence of Zipf’s coeﬃcients is consistent with the evidence
on the volatility of industry productivity shocks.
5Reversion to the mean in the productivity process can generate exogenous mean reversion in
city growth rates.
234. NUMERICAL EXERCISES
This section is devoted to illustrating the solution presented in the previous section.
Summarizing, we obtain Zipf’s Law exactly if we either eliminate capital or make
capital accumulation linear; in all other cases the log rank-size relationship is concave
and the absolute value of the slope is negatively related to the variance of industry
shocks. All the results we presented are asymptotic, and the long run distribution is
stochastic. This is illustrated in Figure Three, where we simulate the model for 100
identical industries for the case of ωj =1for all j =1 ,...,J and permanent shocks
(Case 1 of Proposition 4). Along a given sample path, Zipf’s Law holds exactly, apart
from stochastic deviations.
The next step is to illustrate the deviations of Zipf’s Law obtained in our model
when we move away from the assumptions in Proposition 4. Figure Four presents
U.S. data in 2002 for MSAs, together with a numerical simulation of the model with
transitory shocks. We let the model run for 10,000 periods so that the distribution
of city sizes is not changing signiﬁcantly through time.
As one can see in Figure Four, the model does very well — arguably better than Zipf’s
Law — in matching the U.S. data. In particular, and as expected given Proposition
5, the curve is slightly concave as in the data. That is, large cities are too small, and
there are not enough small cities. Both simulations above have been computed for
the particular set of parameter values collected in the following table:
α = β = φBγ = εω δ τ g N ms d
1/30 .20 .01 .9 .95 10 1.02 0 0.5
,
where m and sd are the mean and standard deviation of the normal distribution from
which the logarithm of the transitory shocks are drawn.












































Empirical studies have found that Zipf’s Law ﬁts the data well across a wide variety
of countries and over long periods of time. Therefore, ﬁtting the distribution for one
particular country at a single point in time is not helpful in explaining this general
25phenomenon. Instead, we want to focus on the robustness of the model’s predictions
to variations in the underlying key parameters. Proposition 6 tells us that one key
parameter is the standard deviation of industry shocks. However, the model seems
to be robust (not invariant) to all other parameter values. This justiﬁes our focus on
the standard deviations: the model has identiﬁed this parameter as the main source
of variation in Zipf’s Law coeﬃcients. We illustrate the urban distributions resulting
from diﬀerent assumptions on the standard deviation of temporary shocks in Figure
Five.








Zipf's Law and SD of transitory shocks

























Zipf's Law and SD of permanent shocks













The ﬁgure starts with a standard deviation of 0.5, which implies a Zipf’s coeﬃ-
cient close to 1. If we increase sd to 0.9, the absolute value of the slope of the curve
decreases. That is, cities become less equal. The opposite happens if we reduce sd
substantially, say to 0.1. Cities become more similar. Soo [19] ﬁnds that the coef-
ﬁcients in absolute value tend to be smaller (more unequal distribution of cities) in
Africa, South America and Asia than in Europe, North America and Oceania. Since
most of the developed economies are in the last group of continents, and presumably
these are the countries that experience less volatility of income (that is, smaller in-
dustry shocks), we view the response of the model to changes in sd as identifying the
source of the diﬀerences in Zipf’s coeﬃcients observed in the data.
As we have mentioned, we can use permanent, instead of transitory, shocks in
the model. This implies that in order to have city size distributions for which the
coeﬃcient of the Pareto distribution are close to one, we are constrained to using
much lower standard deviations of shocks. Figure Six illustrates the eﬀect of changes
in the standard deviation of permanent shocks for sd =0 .006,0.02 and 0.07.

















































International evidence on urban structures implies bounds on observed Zipf’s Law
coeﬃcients. These bounds, in turn, imply bounds on admissible industry productivity
shocks. In the rest of this section we compare available evidence on this relationship.
28Toward this, we ﬁrst select two countries that exhibit city size distributions that are
either extremely concentrated or extremely dispersed. The rank size relationship in
Belgium is very steep with a Zipf’s coeﬃcient of 1.59. The standard deviation of
transitory shocks that yields a city size distribution consistent with the Belgian data
is 0.3. The data and the simulation are presented in Figure Seven.
We perform the same exercise for a country that exhibits a very ﬂat rank size
relationship. Saudi Arabia’s cities are very distinct in terms of population sizes, with
aZ i p f ’ sc o e ﬃcient of 0.78. Figure Eight shows the simulation and Saudi Arabia’s
data6. The standard deviation used in the numerical simulation is sd =0 .7.
These two extreme cases give us a range of standard deviations that would imply
city size distributions consistent with what we observe in the data. The next ques-
tion is whether this range is in line with measures of productivity shocks by industry.
T h em o d e lg i v e su sam e t h o dt om a po b s e r v e dZ i p f ’ sc o e ﬃcients into standard de-
viations of productivity shocks, given industry heterogeneity. As we have done so
far, we want to gauge the performance of the model without relying on particular
forms of industry heterogeneity that would help our theory, but obscure the main
mechanisms in play. Hence, we assume identical industries and solve for the standard
deviation that produces Zipf’s coeﬃcients consistent with the ones in the data. This
will produce bounds on standard deviations that we will then compare with evidence
on productivity shocks in the data. Horvath [13] measures the standard deviation
and persistence of industry shocks in the United States for 36 industries7.
It is important to stress that this comparison puts a heavy burden on our theory. To
illustrate this, consider a situation where all of the standard deviations of productivity
6There are a few countries that exhibit Zipf’s coeﬃcients that are higher or lower than Belgium
and Saudi Arabia. The reason we do not use them is that typically they have only very few cities.
For example, Guatemala, with 13 cities, has a Zipf’s coeﬁcient of 0.728, while Kuwait, with 28 cities,
has a Zipf’s coeﬃcent of 1.720. Using these countries would only improve the performance of the
model in the comparisons that follow.
7As the United States is the world’s largest economy, we will take this data to represent the
universe of possible productivity shock processes. In order to compare Horvath’s estimates with our
range of standard deviations, we ﬁrst need to map the standard deviations of persistent shocks into
standard deviations of transitory shocks.
29shocks are inside the intervals implied by the range of Zipf’s coeﬃcients. That would
mean that if a country were to have industries that faced only the least variable
productivity shocks, it would still exhibit a Zipf’s coeﬃcient within the range of
international evidence. However, we know that all countries produce in a variety
of industries that face shocks that diﬀer in their standard deviations. Therefore, we
know that it is impossible for all industries’ volatilities to be inside the implied range.
Conversely, if none of the standard deviations were inside the implied range, it would
be evidence against our theory.
Table One presents these estimates and the percentage of industries in Horvath’s
study that lie inside the interval of standard deviations implied by the international
city size data. Perhaps surprisingly, given the nature of the exercise, fully half of the








Implied bounds on the
sd of industry shocks
Min Max
% of Horvath’s industries
inside the sd range
[Min,Max]0 .3080 0.7300 50
[10%,90%] 0.3850 0.6200 25
[20%,80%] 0.4200 0.5750 19
8The estimates in the table were computed using city data from 73 countries. Data of ag-
glomerations are only available for 26 mostly developed economies. Using agglomeration data, the
corresponding number is 33%.
30Similarly, we can use the evidence on the standard deviations of industry shocks
to construct bounds on Zipf’s coeﬃcients. In contrast with the previous exercise, the
fact that countries have diversiﬁed industrial structures implies that this exercise will
produce only loose bounds on the range of Zipf’s coeﬃcients that we should observe
in the data. Not surprisingly, as shown in Table Two, the Zipf’s coeﬃcient of every
country in our data set is inside the interval implied by the industry data. This
remains true even if we focus only on those industries at the center of the distribution
of standard deviations.
Reality surely lies between the bounds implied by these two exercises. This allows
us to conclude that the theory is performing well for most industries and countries. It
is also clear that in order to derive tighter bounds we would need to take a stand on
industry heterogeneity. This would require disaggregated data on industrial structure
for a wide set of countries. To the best of our knowledge, these data are not available
beyond a small sample of developed economies, and so we leave this empirical exercise
for future research.
Table Two
Distribution of sd of








%o fc o u n t r i e si n s i d et h e
Zipf’s coeﬃcient range
[Min,Max]0 .1444 6.2389 100
[10%,90%] 0.4535 3.6862 100
[20%,80%] 0.7675 2.1933 97
315. CONCLUSIONS
We have presented an urban growth theory in which cities arise endogenously out of
at r a d e - o ﬀ between agglomeration forces and congestion costs. Our theory is capable
of reproducing several basic growth and urban facts. The urban structure itself leads
to a reconciliation between the increasing returns at the local level that are necessary
for agglomeration and constant returns at the aggregate level that are necessary for
balanced growth. This has two additional implications for growth theory. First, tests
for the presence of increasing returns should be conducted at the urban, and not the
aggregate, level. Second, diﬀerences in the urban organization of economic activity
may explain some part of the observed diﬀerences in total factor productivity across
countries.
We ﬁnd that the organization of economic activity in cities combined with pro-
ductivity shocks and factor accumulation produce strong implications for the size
distribution of cities. In particular, under special assumptions, the model predicts an
exact version of Zipf’s Law, while more generally the model can be used to explain
some of the robust empirical deviations from Zipf’s Law, including the underrepre-
sentation of small cities and the fact that the largest cities are not large enough.
One of the features of the model is that it was especially tractable as a result of spe-
cial functional form assumptions. We were able to solve for the entire growth path of
the economy, and the entire urban structure, in closed form. A potentially important
extension of this paper is to check the robustness of our results to diﬀerent speciﬁ-
cations of the economy. For example, at the moment the assumption of logarithmic
preferences implies that the labor allocation across industries is ﬁxed, and in all of
the experiments conducted in the paper we have assumed that this is equal across
industries. However, in the data, the size distribution of industry employment levels
is already much closer to Zipf’s Law. What are the assumptions on preferences that
would yield a distribution of industry sizes closer to the one observed in the data?
Other extensions include using diﬀerent types of agglomeration eﬀects, combining
32productivity shocks with taste shocks, or adding amenities and nontraded goods or
services to cities (for example, as in Gabaix [10] and Cordoba [5]).
An extension that deserves special consideration is to allow for diﬀerent speciﬁca-
tions of land ownership and city formation. The current speciﬁcation, which follows
the contributions of Henderson [12] and Black and Henderson [4], implies that re-
sources are allocated eﬃciently across cities. The basic results will continue to hold
in an environment with suboptimal cities as long as the deviation from optimality
is roughly proportional: industries will still act as though they face constant returns
to scale, expanding the number of cities at a suboptimal size. Moreover, as long
as the equilibrium city size responds to variations in factor proportions, the same
mechanisms will lead to a tendency toward Gibrat’s Law of city growth.
One of the advantages of the simple speciﬁcation we adopted above is that it allowed
us to identify analytically the standard deviation of industry productivity shocks as
the crucial factor inﬂuencing the ability of the mechanism to match features of the
data. An empirical analysis of this parameter, and how it diﬀers across countries, is
certain to be an important part of any systematic empirical evaluation of our theory.
Finally, it is worth pointing out that Zipf’s Law is also a strikingly good description
of the size distribution of ﬁrms (see Axtell [2]). As it stands, our theory assumes
internal constant returns to scale at the ﬁrm level, and hence the size distribution of
ﬁrms is indeterminate. A natural question is whether the same processes we described
could be used at the ﬁrm level. Speciﬁcally, assume that there are increasing returns
in production, but that the ﬁrms must bear a ‘managerial cost’ that is increasing in
the number of employees of the ﬁrm and is denominated in terms of the ﬁrm’s own
output. Suppose also that the ﬁrm accumulates its own factors and faces stochastic
ﬁrm productivity shocks. Then a simple relabelling of terms would make the model
of the paper also a model of the ﬁrm: instead of choosing the number of cities, the
ﬁrm would choose the number of plants to operate. The ﬁr m sa saw h o l ew o u l dt h e n
behave as though they had constant returns to scale in the aggregate even though
there were increasing returns at the plant level. Moreover, this would allow us to
33imbed this model of the ﬁrm within our existing model of city formation in which
there are external economies at the city level. Whether these elements can all be
combined in a version of the above framework is the subject of future research.
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36APPENDIX
Solution of Social Planner’s Problem









































To solve this problem, we can verify that the value function of the problem takes
the form




























j (1 − ωj)
δDK
j (1 − ωj)+( 1− δ)θj
ˆ Ytj.



























1 − ˆ αj − ˆ βj
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(1 − δ)θjˆ βj





j = θjˆ αj +
δθjˆ βj (1 − ωj)ˆ αj
1 − δωj − δ (1 − ωj) ˆ βj
.
We would like to ﬁnd out what these results imply for the law of motion of capital
and human capital. For this, notice that for human capital,












lnKtj = ωj lnKt−1j +( 1− ωj)
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j (1 − ωj)+( 1− δ)θj
.
Of course,
ln ˆ Ytj =l n ( Fj)+ln(Atj)+ˆ αj ln(Htj)+ˆ βj ln(Ktj)+
³
















lnKtj = ωj lnKt−1j +( 1− ωj)[lnxj +l n ( Fj)+l n ( At−1j)+ˆ αj ln(Ht−1j)
+ˆ βj ln(Kt−1j)+
³















Given that we are interested in characterizing the solution with shocks, we want to
determine the invariant distribution of the model. For this, we want to characterize
ﬁrst limt→∞ lnKtj − lnKt−1j. Taking diﬀerences, recursively substituting, assuming
that ˆ βj < 1 and that population growth is constant, so that Nt =( gN)
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+ ˆ βj ln(Ktj) −
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The problem of the ﬁrm is to hire labor and human and physical capital to maximize
proﬁts given prices for these inputs and taking as given the total amount of labor input
in the city (and hence the size of the externality term) and factor prices. As there
are constant returns to scale within the ﬁrm, we can treat each city as though it had
ar e p r e s e n t a t i v eﬁrm. If we let Ptj,W tj,R tj, and Stj be the prices and rental rates
written in terms of some numeraire commodity, the ﬁrm’s optimization problem yields
Wtj/Ptj =
¡

















tj are subsidies paid by city developers to attract ﬁrms to a particular
city.
As noted above in our discussion of the property developer’s problem, all cities pro-
ducing good j will be the same size. Note that in our framework, all cities producing
good j are identical, so that if there are µtj cities producing good j, the amounts of
labor and human capital in any one city are given by Htj/µtj and Ntj/µtj.
Households.–
Each worker spends utj amount of time working, with the remainder of each












j are some positive constants.
Clearly, households will allocate their labor and human and physical capital services
to the cities with the highest wages and rental rates, so that in an equilibrium these
must be equal across all cities producing a given good. If we let Wtj, Rtj, and Stj
denote state contingent sequences of wages and rental rates in each industry and Ptj














40subject to sequences of ﬂow budget constraints
J X
j=1




[WtjNtjutj + RtjKtj + StjHj + PtjTtjNtj],
where ACCtj and ARtj represent average commuting costs and average rents. The



















Note that the prices Pj,W j,R j,a n dSj all depend on the economywide state variables
¯ Hj, ¯ Kj and ¯ Aj. The state vector for each household also includes the household’s
stocks of human and physical capital, Hj and Kj.
City Developers.–
City developers aim to maximize rents net of transfers oﬀered to households and
subsidies paid to ﬁrms in order to attract them to the city. That is, city developers
choose factor inputs in the city Ntj/µtj,K tj/µtj and Htj/µtj, transfers to households
Ttj and subsidies to physical and human capital, τk
tj,τh
tj, to maximize
















































































We are now in a position to deﬁne a competitive equilibrium for this economy.
Deﬁnition 1 A Competitive Equilibrium for this economy is a set of state contingent
sequences Ctj,X tj,u tj,N tj,µ tj,H tj,K tj for each industry j a n de a c hp e r i o dt,a n da
price system Ptj,W tj,R tj,S tj and transfers and subsidies Ttj,τk
tj,τh
tj for each industry
j at each period t, such that
1. given Ptj,W tj,R tj,S tj and Ttj, households optimize,
2. given Ptj,W tj,R tj,S tj and τk
tj,τh
tj, ﬁrms hire Ktj,H tj and Ntjutj so as to max-
imize proﬁts,
3. given Ptj,W tj,R tj,S tj, developers choose Ttj,τk
tj,τh
tj and Ntj/µtj,K tj/µtj,H tj/µtj
to maximize proﬁts,
4. aggregate and individual decisions are consistent,
5. free entry implies zero proﬁts for developers, and
6. markets for goods and factors clear:











Proposition 1 There exists a unique Pareto eﬃcient allocation for this economy.
Proof. A st h en u m b e ro fc i t i e so fe a c ht y p eµtj enters only into the resource con-


















We will study the properties of this expression for given strictly positive values of
Ktj,H tj,u tj and Ntj. Let









42Then it is easy to see that









under our assumption that εj + γj < 1/2, is strictly increasing in µtj, equals zero
when µtj =0 , and is unbounded as µtj tends to positive inﬁnity. Hence, there exists a
µ∗ such that for all µ ≤ µ∗, the expression in (13) is negative, while for all other µ it
is strictly positive. Moreover, in the limit as µ goes to inﬁnity, the expression in (13)
goes to zero. Hence, as the expression is continuous in µ, it possesses a maximum on
[µ∗,+∞), which from the ﬁrst order necessary condition satisﬁes











Rearranging the ﬁrst order condition we also ﬁnd that the optimal number of cities












If we substitute these expressions into the above optimization problem, we get the
augmented social planning problem described above. This problem is convex, and as
the objective function is strictly concave, it possesses a unique solution. As a result of
the functional form assumptions, the solution has strictly positive levels for physical
and human capital, employment and hours worked at every date and in every state of
the world. Hence the solution of the adjusted programming problem also satisﬁes the
constraints of the social planning problem, and hence it is also the unique solution to
the social planning problem.
Proposition 2 There exists a competitive equilibrium that attains the Pareto eﬃcient
allocation.
Proposition 3 Every competitive equilibrium in this economy is Pareto eﬃcient.
Proof. Let us start with the solution of the SPP. We know that this solution is the





































































































































































To show that this allocation is equivalent to the one attained in the competitive
equilibrium we need to compare this set of conditions with the corresponding set of
conditions for the competitive equilibrium. This is what we turn to next.













44subject to sequences of ﬂow budget constraints
J X
j=1




[WtjNtjutj + RtjKtj + StjHj + PtjTtjNtj],





















t be the multipliers on budget constraints, γHH
Ktj and γHH
Htj be those on
physical and human capital accumulation, and γHH
Nt be that on labor supply, the ﬁrst















































































3. Developer choices and free entry:
45The relevant ﬁrst order conditions from the developer’s problem after some rear-




















Notice that, as expected, the subsidy on capital is zero since there is no externality



























which is exactly the ﬁrst order condition of the social planner’s problem with respect
to µtj.U s i n gt h es e c o n dﬁrst order condition and the fact that ﬁrms choose human


















In order to establish the equivalence, it is suﬃc i e n tt oe s t a b l i s ht h a tt h eﬁrst order
conditions of each set of problems are multiples of each other (that is, it is suﬃcient
to establish the existence of the appropriate set of Lagrange multipliers in each case).
The equivalences follow easily. Comparing the social planner’s ﬁrst order condition









































Using these results along with the ﬁrst order condition of the ﬁrm, we can easily
establish the equivalence of the ﬁrst order condition with respect to capital. In order
to establish the equivalence of the human capital Euler equation of the planner’s
and household’s problem, substitute in the latter the ﬁrst order condition of the
developer’s problem. All that remains is to establish the city part of the problem.
From the SP problem we have the ﬁrst order conditions in Ntj and µtj. From the
competitive problem we have the household’s ﬁrst order condition in Ntj combined
with the developer’s free entry and optimality conditions. From the household’s ﬁrst
order condition, imposing free entry of developers, we get
Wtj
Ptj










Substituting for real wages, we get
¡
















Substituting the results from the city developer’s problem, we obtain
¡


















This latter equation is the same as the ﬁrst order condition for Ntj from the social













47Proposition 4 (Exact Gibrat’s Law and Zipf’s Law) The growth process of city sizes
satisﬁes Gibrat’s Law, and therefore the invariant distribution for city sizes satisﬁes
Zipf’s Law, if and only if one of the following two conditions is satisﬁed:
1. (No physical capital) There is no physical capital
³
βj = ˆ βj =0or ωj =1
´
,a n d
productivity shocks are permanent.
2. (AK model) City production is linear in physical capital and there is no human
capital
³
ˆ αj =0 , ˆ βj =1
´
, depreciation is 100% (ωj =0 ), and productivity shocks
are temporary.
Proof. To show that the growth process of city sizes satisﬁes Gibrat’s Law, note that























which varies with j but is independent of city size, as E [ln(At+1j)|ln(Atj)] is inde-
pendent of ln(Atj).











=2[ l n( At+1j) − ln(Atj)] + 2[ln(Kt+1j) − ln(Ktj)].
But under these conditions
Kt+1j = Xtj = xjYtj = xjFjAtjKtju
ˆ φj
tj ,


















But this is independent of city size.
To show that this implies an invariant distribution that satisﬁes Zipf’s Law, we
can apply the results of Gabaix [10] and Cordoba [5]. Under our restriction of ex-
ante industry heterogeneity, we can do this group by group. The results then follow
from Propositions 1 and 2 in Gabaix [10], which show that an invariant distribution
satisfying Zipf’s Law is the result of the limit of the processes above augmented with
ar e ﬂecting barrier as this barrier goes to zero.
48Proposition 5 (Concavity) If conditions 1 and 2 in Proposition 4 are not satisﬁed,
the growth rate for cities exhibits reversion to the mean.











=2 [ l n ( At+1j) − ln(Atj)] − 2
³













+2ˆ βj [ln(Kt+1j) − ln(Ktj)].
The only places that productivity shocks enter this equation is through their con-
temporaneous eﬀects on output and through the accumulation of past capital. If
we examine the equation for capital accumulation, recursively substituting, we ﬁnd,

















ωj +( 1− ωj) ˆ βj











































ωj +( 1− ωj) ˆ βj
´t−1¶
(1 − ωj).
If we take limits into the inﬁnite past, so as to remove the eﬀect of initial conditions,
this expression reduces to ˆ βj (1 − ωj), so that the weights on past productivity shocks
sum to minus one.
From this we can conclude that if the city type is of average size, deﬁned as having
experienced a sequence of past shocks whose weighted average is E (lnA), then the
expected growth rate of the city is zero. By contrast, if the past shocks have a
weighted average greater than (less than) E (lnA), then the expected growth rates
are negative (positive).
49Proposition 6 If conditions 1 and 2 in Proposition 4 are not satisﬁed, the standard
deviation of city sizes increases with the standard deviation of industry shocks.
Proof. If conditions 1 and 2 in Proposition 4 are not satisﬁed, the variance of the



























































which is increasing in v, thereby proving the result.
If shocks are not i.i.d., a higher unconditional variance implies that V0 [lnKtj] is
larger, since
³
ωj +( 1− ωj) ˆ βj
´t−T
is positive for every 1 >ω j > 0 and 1 > ˆ βj > 0.
Higher unconditional variance implies that V0 [ln(Atj)] is larger for every t,a n ds o
the variance of city sizes increases.
50